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In 1871, the United States Congress formally concluded 
treaty-making with Native American Tribes within its borders.1 
While Tribal lands were by that time already considered by the 
federal government to be “interior” to the United States rather than 
autonomous, foreign nations,2 the move effectively paved the way 
for subsequent federal policies of allotment and assimilation that 
would dispossess Tribes of not only land and resources, but also 
 
*   Dr. Trevor Reed (Hopi) is an associate professor of law at Arizona State 
University’s Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law. I thank Joshua Bell, Paul Bender,  
Stewart Koyiymptewa, Gregg Leslie, Ben McJunkin, Robert Post, Michael Serota, Bijal Shah, 
James Weinstein, Justin Weinstein-Tull, and Ilan Wurman for their helpful insights and 
feedback in the development of this article. I also thank the Ford Foundation, Hopi Cultural 
Preservation Office, and the Hopi Education Endowment Fund for its generous support of 
my field research. 
 1. See 25 U.S.C. § 71 (“No Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United 
States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with 
whom the United States may contract by treaty . . . .”). However, though treaty-making may 
have been ended by Congress, the power over treaty-making with Native American Tribes 
remains with Congress. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 2. The agency responsible for administering Indian affairs and Tribal lands was 
transferred from the Department of War to the newly created Department of the Interior in 
1849. See History of BIA, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, https://www.bia.gov/bia (last visited 
Mar. 6, 2020); see also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831) (denominating 
Indigenous groups within the United States “domestic dependent nations” and rejecting 
their status as “foreign nations”). 
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their culture and identity.3 Paradoxically, however, by the late 
1880s, Tribal lands became inundated with American 
anthropologists and their new recording technologies. Spurred by 
both the invention of the phonograph in 1877, and the creation of 
the U.S. Bureau of American Ethnology in 1879, anthropologists 
from American research institutions would spend roughly a 
century documenting nearly every aspect of Native American 
lives.4 Their task was deemed an urgent one: to gather what they 
could about “Indians” as a race and as distinct cultural groups—
languages, customs, laws, oral histories, religions, and arts—before 
their “primitive lifeways” came to an end as proclaimed by then 
prevailing theories of social Darwinism.5 
Indigenous cultural documentation amassed during this era 
constituted what might be considered America’s first instance of 
“big data”—a comprehensive set of information aggregated for the 
purpose of understanding a group’s social relationships and 
predicting their behaviors.6 Field notes, photographs, sound 
recordings, maps, kinship charts, and all manner of other cultural 
materials collected from Tribal members were shipped off to 
distant universities, museums, and archives (“Institutions”). They 
were then analyzed to formulate new academic theories about race, 
culture, and human evolution, which subsequently fueled the 
 
 3. See Angela R. Riley & Kristen A. Carpenter, Owning Red: Toward a Theory of Indian 
(Cultural) Appropriation, 94 TEX. L. REV. 859, 877–78 (2015) (explaining how the federal 
government-imposed policies that broke up Tribal land masses and curtailed subsistence 
practices while simultaneously outlawing Tribal religious and cultural practices and forcing 
children to attend American boarding schools often far from Tribal lands). 
 4. For a comprehensive overview of early ethnographic sound recording, see generally 
ERIKA BRADY, A SPIRAL WAY: HOW THE PHONOGRAPH CHANGED ETHNOGRAPHY (1999). 
 5. See Richard B. Woodbury & Nathalie F.S. Woodbury, The Rise and Fall of the Bureau 
of American Ethnology, 41 J. SW. 283, 285–86 (1999); see also JONATHAN STERNE, A Resonant 
Tomb, in THE AUDIBLE PAST: CULTURAL ORIGINS OF SOUND REPRODUCTION 287–334 (2003). 
 6. As Oxford’s online dictionary defines it, “big data” consists of “[e]xtremely large 
data sets that may be analyzed computationally to reveal patterns, trends, and associations, 
especially relating to human behavior and interactions.” Big Data, LEXICO.COM, 
https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/big_data (last visited Nov. 9, 2020). A full 
comparison of the methods and objects of “big data” to early anthropological field work is 
beyond the scope of this symposium article; however, I hope to take up this comparative 
work in future writing. 
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development of experimental federal Indian policies aimed at 
making Americans out of Tribal members.7 
This original “big data” set, still meticulously preserved in 
research institutions and federal repositories today, is in some cases 
an invaluable resource for Tribes—many of which are searching for 
evidence to support legal claims or are working to revitalize aspects 
of culture disrupted by the very government policies these 
collections were originally meant to support. While often touted by 
collectors and Institutions as rich historical and cultural resources,8 
I argue that some of these collections have become toxic in their 
preserved forms, separated from their communities’ modes of care. 
These materials are among those that Indigenous groups should 
have the right to remove from settler Institutions and, if necessary, 
to erase, delete, or destroy. 
The kind of Indigenous right to erase sensitive cultural material 
held by settler institutions I begin to sketch in this essay is not 
unlike data privacy rights already existing in European and 
European-descended legal systems. A right to prevent intrusive 
recording of one’s private affairs has existed in the United States for 
at least the last century,9 and a right to compel data controllers to 
erase private data (the “right to be forgotten”) under certain 
conditions has been codified by the European Union in its General 
Data Protection Regulation  and to some extent by the State of 
 
 7. See Woodbury & Woodbury, supra note 5; Lomayumtewa C. Ishii, Western Science 
Comes to the Hopis: Critically Deconstructing the Origins of an Imperialist Canon, 25 WICAZO SA 
REV. 65, 82 (2010) (discussing how anthropological study of Indigenous culture by major 
anthropological collectors was a necessary input for the United States in its development of 
policies that exerted dominion and intellectual hegemony over Native Americans). 
 8. See, e.g., Aaron Fox, Archive of the Archive: The Secret History of the Laura Boulton 
Collection, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO CULTURAL PROPERTY 194 (Jane Anderson & 
Haidy Geismar eds., 2017) (describing the way the Laura Boulton World Music Collection, 
while empty of any real scholarly value, was nonetheless leveraged for grants and donations 
to Columbia University). 
 9. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (Am. L. Inst. 1977) (defining 
the tort for intrusion upon seclusion as “intentionally intrud[ing], physically or otherwise, upon 
the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns . . . if the intrusion would 
be highly offensive to a reasonable person,” and citing examples of various forms of 
recordation, wiretapping, and eavesdropping); see also Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of 
Privacy: Community and the Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 965 (1989) (finding 
the origins of the privacy tort as presently constituted stem from Samuel Warren and Louis 
Brandeis’s 1890 article The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890)). 
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California in its Consumer Privacy Act.10 While much of the debate 
surrounding a right to data erasure in the United States has focused 
on tensions between personal autonomy and the right of the public 
to be informed,11 the collective rights of Indigenous peoples to 
maintain, control, and develop their  intellectual properties and 
data provide important, yet often overlooked considerations.12 
In the pages that follow, I draw from historical and 
ethnographic research conducted in partnership with the Hopi 
community (members of which reside in present-day Northeastern 
Arizona and beyond) to better understand why some forms of 
culture must necessarily be forgotten for a community to fully live. 
The right to collectively forget is vital in our data-saturated world, 
and all the more so for colonized communities whose ancestors’ 
voices and likenesses continue to be held by settler Institutions. 
Recognizing Indigenous peoples’ rights to care for their ancestors’ 
voices and other cultural data would undoubtedly require a 
significant shift in the way Institutions conceptualize Indigenous 
cultural materials in their collections—from a curatable past-on-
demand that substitutes for actual Indigenous presences and 
futures, to one respecting the sovereignty of contemporary 
Indigenous peoples and these materials’ actual lives and existences. 
But these advances are necessary if we are sincerely committed to 
realizing Indigenous self-determination and cultural rights in the 
age of big data. 
 
 10. See Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 17, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 43; California Consumer 
Privacy Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.1 et seq. 
 11. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88  
(Feb. 13, 2012), https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-paradox-the-right-to-
be-forgotten/ (arguing that the right to be forgotten “represents the biggest threat to free 
speech on the Internet in the coming decade”); Robert C. Post, Data Privacy and Dignitary 
Privacy: Google Spain, The Right to Be Forgotten, and the Construction of the Public Sphere,  
67 DUKE L.J. 981, 994 (2018) (“There is no doubt serious tension between the right to be 
forgotten and freedom of expression, and different legal systems resolve this tension in 
different ways.”). 
 12. See G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. DOCS. A/RES/61/295, United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, art. 31 (Sept. 13, 2007). 
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I. HOPI FORGETTING: A CASE STUDY 
As a ceremonial leader13 from my home village on the Hopi 
Reservation14 entered the final stages of cancer, he related to me his 
determination that he could not pass along key aspects of his 
ceremonial knowledge to others in our community. He was the last 
fully initiated man from our village—the last person with the 
knowledge and authority to carry out certain vital rituals. As such, 
he had received numerous visits to his hospital room from leaders 
across Hopi lands, asking him questions and seeking the 
knowledge he carried so that these important aspects of our 
community life could continue unabated. He related to me that he 
empathized with these leaders, but without fully functioning 
ceremonial and political institutions within our village, the decision 
over whether to pass along his knowledge and authority were 
effectively already made for him. The ceremonies he knew and the 
knowledge they contained would die with him. 
This leader’s choice not to disclose his ceremonial knowledge 
or pass along his ritual authority followed in the footsteps of other 
Hopi leaders who each faced the decision of whether or not to 
silence aspects of our Tribal culture. These decisions often had to 
be made during periods of coerced cultural forgetting—eras of 
harshly enforced prohibitions on ceremonial performances (which 
were sometimes perpetuated secretly),15 kidnapping and relocation 
 
 13. I do not disclose the name of this leader out of respect for our local protocols, 
which counsel that we should avoid repeated uses of the names of the deceased. 
 14. The “Hopi Indian Reservation” was designated as such in 1882 through an 
Executive Order of Chester A. Arthur, who was then President of the United States. It is 
located in the northeastern portion of what is now the U.S. state of Arizona. The sovereign 
Hopi Tribe, which now governs the Hopi People and their territory, is considered a 
“domestic dependent nation[]” by the United States. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 
17 (1831). It should be noted, however, that Hopi aboriginal territory spans a much broader 
swath of the American Southwest than the somewhat arbitrary boundaries of  
President Arthur’s Reservation, covering parts of what is now Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, 
and Mexico. 
 15. Leigh Kuwanwisiwma, as quoted in a 2015 collection of interviews and documents 
on the Spanish colonization of Hopi lands, had the following to say about the role of memory 
in the Spanish occupation of Hopi lands:  
So inasmuch as the [Hopi] ceremonies were now publicly forbidden [by the 
Spanish] to be performed, some of the people talk about how the knowledge was 
still being rehearsed and then also passed on to coming generations so that at least 
the knowledge would survive and then the physical end of it, meaning perhaps 
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of Hopi children to boarding schools, and imposition of non-Hopi 
ways of living on Hopi lands.16 Given these and other changes 
brought on by settler colonization in the United States, many Hopi 
people have expressed to me their fears that our culture is “dying 
out”—that modernization, globalization, and acculturation have 
displaced people’s attachments to Hopi lands, our language, and 
our ceremonial performances. These changes, foretold in Hopi 
teachings, signal to Hopi people that the world is progressing 
rapidly toward its prophesied end. 
Hopi people are not alone in this prediction. As far back as 1540, 
and right up to the present day, a number of anthropologists, 
folklorists, ethnomusicologists, tourists, and missionaries believed 
that Hopi and other Indigenous peoples’ cultures would die out.17 
The field recordings, archeological specimens, and other forms of 
data they collected under this pretext fill numerous libraries and 
archives worldwide.18 But the underlying rationale for their labor—
 
the altars and the types of ritual objects, would also be re-created and subsequently 
used if they ever had an opportunity to come back with their ceremonies. 
1 MOQUIS AND KASTIILAM: HOPIS, SPANIARDS AND THE TRAUMA OF HISTORY 173 (Thomas E. 
Sheridan, Stewart B. Koyiyumptewa, Anton Daughters, Dale S. Brenneman, T.J. Ferguson, 
Leigh Kuwanwisiwma & Lee Wayne Lomayestewa eds., 2015). 
 16. See HARRY C. JAMES, PAGES FROM HOPI HISTORY 125 (1974); JOHN D. LOFTIN, 
RELIGION AND HOPI LIFE 108–21 (2d ed. 2003). 
 17. Spanish priests demonstrated their belief that Hopi culture would (or could be 
made to) die through violent acts of what they considered to be “discipline” aimed at saving 
Hopi people from their “‘slavery” to “idols” and thus making them worthy of heaven.  
See MOQUIS AND KASTIILAM: HOPIS, SPANIARDS AND THE TRAUMA OF HISTORY, supra note 15, 
at 132, 238. Many early American anthropologists also corroborated the fatalistic intentions 
of colonization through their work, claiming that Hopi and other Indigenous cultural 
practices needed documentation and preservation because they would inevitably become 
extinct. See BRADY, supra note 4, at 75–80; see also STERNE, supra note 5, at 331–32. Moreover, 
ethnomusicologists from as recently as a generation ago also proclaimed the (impending) 
death of Hopi culture. See George List, Song in Hopi Culture, Past and Present, 14 J. INT’L FOLK 
MUSIC COUNCIL 30 (1962); LAURA BOULTON, THE MUSIC HUNTER: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A 
CAREER (1968). More recently, however, some anthropologists have begun to note that it is 
actually anthropology that may be dying out, due to lack of diversity, lack of action, and 
irrelevance to the real world. See Peter M. Whiteley, The End of Anthropology (at Hopi)?, 35 J. 
SW. 125, 148 (1993). 
 18. In 1977, David Laird produced a 3500-entry bibliography of scholarly writings on 
the Hopi people alone. See W. DAVID LAIRD, HOPI BIBLIOGRAPHY: COMPREHENSIVE AND 
ANNOTATED (1977). The number of extant Hopi ritual artifacts, human remains, 
photographs, and other cultural items is impossible to calculate given that they exist in both 
public and private collections around the world. Hopi sound recording collections are 
numerous, including scholarly recordings made by Jesse Walter Fewkes, Natalie Curtis 
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the belief that Indigenous peoples would become extinct or their 
cultures would “evolve” to mirror colonizing societies—has itself 
become a casualty of intellectual evolution. Today, scholars, 
community activists, and Tribal leaders work together to 
reintegrate culturally-affiliated museum and archival materials 
back into Indigenous communities that are very much alive and 
intent on reclaiming and perpetuating their culture.19 While many 
of these materials have become reincorporated into Indigenous 
communities’ social fabrics, some contain aspects of rituals, 
ceremonies, or other culturally sensitive content that has or will 
soon become purposely extinguished by Tribes themselves, setting 
up an uncomfortable conflict between the institutional impetus to 
perpetually preserve and the decisions of Indigenous authorities, 
like our village leader, to let some of our culture die. 
As the Hopi Tribe has discovered, current legal frameworks fail 
to provide the range of remedies necessary to deal with these 
challenging and sensitive issues. In the mid-1990s, relying on the 
federal Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act 
(NAGPRA)20 and the Hopi Tribe’s own laws claiming ownership 
over Hopi human remains, artifacts, and recordings of “esoteric 
ritual, ceremonial and religious knowledge,”21 the Tribe sent 
hundreds of letters to Institutions demanding the return of its 
cultural property from their collections.22 As Tribal officials later 
explained it to me, they received a mixed response. Some 
Institutions made no reply, while others contested Hopi authority 
 
Burlin, Samuel Barrett, Helen Roberts, Earnest and Pearl Beaglehole, Willard Rhodes,  
Robert Black, George List, and Robert Rhodes. For more information on these and other 
collectors, see Archive of Traditional Music, IND. UNIV. – BLOOMINGTON, 
https://libraries.indiana.edu/archives-traditional-music (last visited Oct. 19, 2020), and  
The American Folklife Center, LIBR. OF CONG., https://www.loc.gov/ 
folklife/index.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2020). Recordings made by tourists, missionaries, 
and Hopi or other Indigenous peoples are also numerous. 
 19. Mique’l Dangeli, Dancing Chiax, Dancing Sovereignty: Performing Protocol in Unceded 
Territories, 48 DANCE RSCH. J. 74 (2016); Robin R.R. Gray (T’uu’tk), Ts’msyen Revolution:  
The Poetics and Politics of Reclaiming (Sept. 2015) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Massachusetts Amherst) (on file with SCHOLARWORKS@UMassAmherst), 
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_2/437/. 
 20. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–13. 
 21. Res. H-70-94, Hopi Tribal Council (1994) (on file with the author). 
 22. See MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE? 14–18 (2003). 
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to demand the return of their cultural materials.23 Still others  
took the opportunity to relieve themselves of the burden of  
these materials: shortly after the demand letters were sent, package 
after package arrived at the Tribal offices, filling their cubicles 
to overflowing.24 
On one occasion, the Tribe received some particularly 
important ritual items that Hopi village leaders were looking 
forward to reusing in upcoming ceremonies. It seemed like the 
Tribe was finally receiving the restitution it deserved from 
centuries of taking; repatriation efforts were now providing 
opportunities to revitalize aspects of Hopi culture that had been 
absent for many years. But soon after the ceremonial performers 
began using the repatriated items, they became sick, with rashes 
and sores appearing where the items had come in contact with their 
bodies. Medical professionals soon discovered, much to everyone’s 
horror, that the items had been preserved with arsenic.25 Arsenic, 
while effectively preserving the life of the ritual items as museum 
objects, had poisoned the very people for whom the objects had 
been created. 
I relate this story about the harms produced by toxic artifacts 
because they are, I argue, analogous to the potential dangers of 
preserving Indigenous voices, images, and other forms of culture 
outside of Indigenous modes of care. At first glance, the risks of 
reusing preserved ritual artifacts may seem completely benign. One 
could argue that vocal sound is merely air vibrations, which can’t 
poison anyone, or that using a digital photo for one purpose—say, 
scholarly historical analysis—doesn’t diminish someone else’s 
 
 23. See Trevor George Reed, Returning Hopi Voices: Toward a Model for Community-
Partnered Repatriation of Archived Traditional Music 28 (2009) (unpublished M.A. thesis, 
Teachers College, Columbia University) (on file with author); Interview with Leigh 
Kuwanwisiwma, Dir. Hopi Tribal Cultural Pres. Off., in Kykotsmovi, Ariz. (Sept. 1, 2009). 
 24. See Reed, supra note 23, at 66; BROWN, supra note 22, at 18. 
 25. From the early 1840s until at least the 1990s, Lisa Goldberg reports that arsenic 
was commonly used to preserve collected specimens and as a seal for storage containers, 
particularly those processed into “natural history” collections. Some objects in the collections 
of the Smithsonian Museum, for example, are labeled “poisoned” and provided with the 
date when they were so preserved. See Lisa Goldberg, A History of Pest Control Measures in 
the Anthropology Collections, National Museum of Natural History, Smithsonian Institution, 35 J. 
AM. INST. CONSERVATION 23, 29–30, 32 (1996). 
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experience of it—say, to revitalize a ceremonial practice.26 And yet, 
real injuries may happen when certain kinds of cultural data—
particularly ceremonial or ritual recordings—are uncritically 
recirculated to new publics or even reincorporated into the 
originating community’s social fabric after a long absence.27 As 
hybrids of settler modes of preservation and Indigenous generative 
power, preserved Indigenous voices, images, and cultural texts 
may take on a heightened degree of toxicity.28 Much more than 
lifeless “data,” the cacophony of captured voices and cultural 
representations on settler Institutions’ shelves, expressing 
everything from rituals, histories, beliefs, and nearly every other 
facet of Indigenous peoples’ lives, are in fact “conditions with 
effects, bringing their own affects and animacies to bear on lives 
and nonlives.”29 
The toxification of recorded Hopi and other Indigenous groups’ 
ritual songs collected by early American ethnomusicologist Laura 
Boulton (1899–1980) provides an instructive example. As recent 
scholarship attests, many of the Indigenous recordings in the 
Boulton collection were made under ethically suspect 
 
 26. See Robert Lancefield, On the Repatriation of Recorded Sound from 
Ethnomusicological Archives: A Survey of Some of the Issues Pertaining to People’s Access 
to Documentation of Their Musical Heritage 47 (1993) (MA thesis, Wesleyan University). 
 27. Leonard Talaswaima, a ceremonial leader from the Hopi village of lower 
Sipaulovi, explained during the Hopi Food and Agricultural Symposium in 2014: 
Some of the songs that people sometimes sing without knowledge of the 
sacredness of the songs may run into difficulties in their lives, so we have to be 
very [careful] . . . . We refer to these songs as being utihi’i—they should be handled 
with care; only people that should handle them need to handle them. They have a 
wuvaapi—a [metaphorical] whip. Anything that may happen to you is part of that. 
Even though they [authorized people] sing them in public, you shouldn’t sing it. 
Trevor Reed, Itaataatawi: Hopi Song, Intellectual Property, and Sonic Sovereignty in an Era 
of Settler-Colonialism 132 (2018) (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University) (third alteration 
in original), https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D87S95D0. 
 28. In theorizing the impact of settler preservation on Indigenous voices and 
knowledge through the lens of toxicity, I draw from gender studies scholar Mel Chen’s 
conceptualization of that term as it emphasizes well the biopolitical aspects of preservation. 
Chen explains that toxicity exists as both a metaphor and as a physically or viscerally 
experienced condition: When viewed as “toxic,” objects carry racialized and gendered 
subjectivities as knowledge, beliefs, and fears about their “toxins” become widely circulated. 
But some toxins may literally “intoxicate” individuals or groups or function as “toxic assets.” 
Thus, the intersection of metaphorical toxicity and toxicity as experience produces real social 
impacts that cannot be overlooked in sociopolitical analyses of objects. See Mel Y. Chen, Toxic 
Animacies, Inanimate Affections, 17 GLQ: J. LESBIAN & GAY STUD. 265 (2011). 
 29. Id. at 282. 
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circumstances, possibly captured through fraud or duress, for the 
purpose of transforming them into “exotic” entertainment geared 
for settler audiences.30 After making the recordings, Boulton 
unilaterally published several albums, disregarding Tribal laws, 
protocols, and ritual authorities designed to ensure their 
appropriate care and to limit the potential harms that might arise if 
used inappropriately.31 Not long thereafter, the recordings became 
further transformed into objects of settler desire and deception. As 
ethnomusicologist Aaron A. Fox reports in his history of the 
collection, during its acquisition by Columbia University, the 
recordings were used as bargaining chips between the university 
and a wealthy octogenarian alumnus intent on gaining Boulton’s 
affections.32 For decades after their acquisition, the recordings 
become research collateral used to secure grants and other funding 
for the Columbia music department.33 Ironically, however, while 
touted by the university as a prized example of scholarship and a 
pillar of the Columbia music department’s holdings, they were 
entirely useless absent the Indigenous communities from whom the 
recordings originated. It was an open secret in Columbia circles that 
the collection’s existence there was merely a front to obtain millions 
of dollars of revenue, none of which has made its way back to the 
Indigenous or other minority communities who produced them.34 
II. THEORIZING ANONYMOUS CARE 
In her 2014 book Life Beside Itself, Lisa Stevenson explores the 
disjuncture between Inuit modes of care and the serialized, 
“anonymous” way of caring espoused by the Canadian 
bureaucracy.35 From governmental health programs that took great 
care to number and organize Inuit people sick with tuberculosis 
before disappearing them into distant sanatoria, to suicide 
prevention hotlines that instructed their volunteers to listen with 
curiosity to Inuit people’s grim suicide plans but not to develop 
personal relationships with them, Stevenson reveals the irony of 
 
 30. See Gray, supra note 19, at 68–74; Reed, supra note 27, at 71–74, 85–89. 
 31. See Trevor Reed, Who Owns Our Ancestors’ Voices?: Tribal Claims to Pre-1972 Sound 
Recordings, 40 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 275, 288–90 (2016). 
 32. See Fox, supra note 8, at 200–02. 
 33. Id. at 200–07. 
 34. See id. 
 35. LISA STEVENSON, LIFE BESIDE ITSELF: IMAGINING CARE IN THE CANADIAN ARCTIC (2014). 
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Canada’s efforts to impersonally “care” about Inuit as an exercise 
in population management.36 As she points out, Canada cares only 
to the extent that it can maintain its power over Indigenous lives: 
“When life becomes an indifferent value, it no longer matters who 
you are, only that you cooperate in the project of staying alive.”37 
In other words, Canada’s care for “its” First Nations is a 
manifestation of a biopolitics that determines who is made to live 
and who the government lets die.38 In stark contrast, Stephenson 
compares a number of Inuit modes of care, including traditional 
Inuit name transfer practices, which allow members of the 
community to care for and be comforted by one another, including 
those lost to illness or suicide. 
Like many forms of settler bureaucracy, archives of fieldwork 
materials are notoriously sites of anonymous care, sites in which 
perpetual preservation of Indigenous voices and likenesses in 
easily accessible packages is privileged over the modes of caring 
established by the communities that generated them. In his volume 
on the cultural threads leading to the development of sound 
recording, Jonathan Sterne explains that the impetus to preserve 
the Indigenous voice that drove early fieldwork was not necessarily 
rooted in a desire to give Indigenous voices immortality, but was 
instead an outgrowth of settler desires to preserve the functionality 
of the Indigenous body despite its (anticipated) death. As he writes, 
“sound recording preserved the exteriority of the voice while 
completely transforming its interiority, its insides.”39 Sterne frames 
field recording as an illusion of live-ness, at best the preservation of 
what the recordist wanted to hear.40 At worst, as Erika Brady 
 
 36. Id. at 3–6, 83–90. 
 37. Id. at 82. 
 38. [Biopolitics] is, in a word, a matter of taking control of life and the biological 
processes of man-as-species and of ensuring that they are not disciplined, but 
regularized. . . . [The development of political s]overeignty took life and let live. 
And now we have the emergence of a power that I would call the power of 
regularization, and it, in contrast, consists in making live and letting die. 
MICHEL FOUCAULT, “SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED”: LECTURES AT THE COLLEGE DE FRANCE, 
1975–76, at 246–47 (Mauro Bertani & Alessandro Fontana eds., David Macey trans., 1976); 
STEVENSON, supra note 35, at 44 (“Thus in the psychic lives of both the colonizer and the 
colonized the biopolitical commandment to stay alive at all costs is haunted by the desire on 
the part of the colonist to murder the colonized, and also by the recurring sense the colonized 
have that what appear to be the most benign public health programs are, in fact, genocidal.”). 
 39. STERNE, supra note 5, at 298. 
 40. Id. at 323–24. 
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reveals, recordings of Indigenous peoples were a mechanical 
means for “bronzing” or “freezing” Indigenous voices into discrete, 
aesthetic facts that could substitute for Indigenous peoples 
themselves.41 Once accessioned to an archive, the priority for 
recorded Indigenous voices continues to be their logical 
organization to support the anticipated ear of the researcher and 
his or her funders, and the perpetual prevention of decay, 
destruction, or non-transferability to newer media. Rather than 
looking to Indigenous communities for direction on the 
appropriate lives of archived Indigenous materials, decisions about 
care all too easily hinge on the needs of institutions to demonstrate 
their power and legitimacy by amassing more and more sonic, 
photographic, or cinematic facts.42 As with the sanatoria and 
suicide prevention centers of Canada, biopolitics is at work in the 
archival care of Indigenous voices and other likenesses: collecting 
them, organizing them, and deciding which are made to live  
(and made to speak/represent) and which it will let die (allow to 
decay, be edited out, or discarded), irrespective of Indigenous 
modes of care.43 
While the impetus to collect Indigenous materials by settler 
researchers like Boulton may have been to “save the lore,” as 
Director John P. Harrington of the U.S. Bureau of American 
Ethnology once phrased it, their care today need not be dictated by 
this now widely repudiated goal.44 Instead, I argue, those who 
work with Indigenous records should look to Indigenous 
 
 41. BRADY, supra note 4, at 59–60. 
 42. Fox, supra note 8. 
 43. Intellectual property and critical museum studies scholar Jane Anderson has 
critiqued the ways in which archival practices and intellectual property laws continue to 
make Indigenous peoples the “subjects” of archival materials, while displacing them from 
positions of care and ownership over these materials: Archival “material comes encoded 
with relations of power and specific entitlements, and continues to position Indigenous 
peoples, cultures, lifestyles and practices within a Eurocentric locus of enunciation.” Jane 
Anderson, Anxieties of Authorship in the Colonial Archive, in MEDIA AUTHORSHIP 232 (C. Chris 
and D. Gerstener, eds., 2013). The mere fact that archives house so many Indigenous voices 
in one place and without any kind of obligation or reciprocation to Indigenous communities clearly 
bespeaks a Euro-American centered ontology of the voice rather than an Indigenous one. 
And this repurposing of the Indigenous voice likewise resonates with Ann Stoler’s view that 
colonial archives are not so much about care for the histories of the colonized, but about 
“factual production” or the narration of “factual stories” in which “the colonial state affirmed 
its fictions to itself[.]” Ann Laura Stoler, Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance,  
2 ARCHIVAL SCI. 87, 97 (2002). 
 44. STERNE, supra note 5, at 314 (quoting John P. Harrington). 
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temporalities and modes of care to determine the appropriate lives 
and after-lives of these materials. Forcing Hopi and other 
Indigenous peoples’ voices to live in a preserved state may run 
counter to the kind of agentive existences that these voices have in 
our communities. 
In the Hopi context, for example, death doesn’t necessarily 
mark a change in one’s existence from a present to a past 
temporality. As Mary Black has written, Hopi conceptions of life 
and death are often analogized to the growth and decay of corn 
plants, which Hopi people have cultivated as a primary source of 
sustenance for millennia.45 After ears of corn are harvested in the 
fall time, the corn stalk eventually dies—it is qatungwu (lifeless) and 
without soona (substance, or “that which makes life viable”). While 
seeds contained in the mature ear will go on to generate new plants 
in different times and places, the corn stalks remain in the ground; 
they are laid down and allowed to decay. But even their decay has 
a purpose: they are not uprooted or plowed under, but they 
collectively become a guide for where to plant the next year, and 
they serve as the mulch that keeps the water and nutrients in the 
ground for years into the future.46 
This pattern holds true in theorizing appropriate care of 
individuals and their voices. The bodies of the dead are 
traditionally not preserved but are allowed to decay. As the 
substance of life is the breath, or hikwsi, in death our hikwsi is said 
to continue on; it is aniwti, or “becoming perfected.” We generally 
free the deceased from their bindings to this world: we burn  
our dead’s belongings, and we don’t speak their names after a 
certain period of time; other members of the decedent’s clan take  
on titles of responsibility (the roles of so’o [grandmother], 
 
 45. See Mary E. Black, Maidens and Mothers: An Analysis of Hopi Corn Metaphors, 
23 ETHNOLOGY 279, 279–81 (1984) (explaining the ways Hopi lives are often compared to 
corn plants within Hopi culture). 
 46. The notion of past lives as slowly decaying guideposts is vital in the perpetuation 
of agentive Indigenous cultures. As Lauren Amsterdam has written about heritage 
expressions in Native hip-hop, “Examining performances of (ab)originality in terms of 
heritage does not presuppose the perfection of enactment, but rather accentuates the 
slippages that emerge as one realizes their agency within a web of larger commitments.” 
Amsterdam goes on to quote Tlingit hip-hop artist D-Script, who explains, “It is necessary 
first of all to know and to know how to reaffirm what comes before us, which we therefore 
receive even before choosing, and to behave in this respect as a free subject.” Lauren J. 
Amsterdam, All the Eagles and the Ravens in the House Say Yeah: (Ab)original Hip-Hop, Heritage, 
and Love, 37 AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RSCH. J. 53, 57 (2013). 
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kwa’a [grandfather]; kya’a [aunt], taha [uncle], etc.) and respective 
obligations of the deceased so that they can continue their work in 
other times and places. We are supposed to let them go. 
Archival materials are unique because they occupy a space in 
between that which is qatungwu and that which has soona. Hopi 
taatawi or traditional songs, for example, when voiced with a good 
heart, are not simply entertainment, art, or cultural texts, but 
actively encourage and empower clouds, people, animals, crops, 
and other entities to come into meaningful relation for the good of 
the world. Because performances of taatawi are not merely aesthetic 
objects but actively do things in the community and the 
environment, decisions about when to use recordings containing 
taatawi and how to care for them must be made with community 
and environmental interests at the forefront. As Hopi Cultural 
Preservation Office Director Stewart B. Koyiymptewa explains, 
remembering and forgetting the relationships between people and 
songs is a natural part of the way in which generations grow, 
assume their leadership role, and then decay—some taatawi 
continue to link contemporary generations with the people and 
places who helped create them, while others begin to fall out of 
people’s memory or are intentionally forgotten.47 
DJ DawaTiyo, a Hopi elder who ran a morning traditional 
music show on KUYI Hopi Radio for several years, took such care 
in his use of archival recordings. DawaTiyo regularly aired 
sometimes scratchy, historic sound recordings of Tribal members 
performing taatawi. After one broadcast in 2013, I asked DawaTiyo 
whether he thought the Hopi public could really relate to these “old 
songs,” many of which were recorded before most members of the 
Tribe were born. He responded: “You know, some people might 
say these are just old songs. But that’s not really how they are for 
us. [For us] they are always present.”48 When old recordings are 
played, he added, they may have someone’s voice from the past on 
them—and that might make them interesting historically. But for 
Indigenous listeners, the songs themselves continue to do what 
they are meant to do. DawaTiyo’s work in reanimating them 
 
 47. BRIAN SWANN, BORN IN THE BLOOD: ON NATIVE AMERICAN TRANSLATION 68–69 
(2017) (quoting Chip Colwell & Stewart B. Koyiymptewa, Translating Time: A Dialogue on 
Hopi Experiences of the Past). 
 48. Interview with Bruce Talawyma, DJ, KUYI Hopi Radio, in Keams Canyon, Hopi 
Reservation (Ariz.) (Aug. 5, 2014). 
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through careful selection and recontextualization helps them to 
fulfill the community-building and encouraging functions for 
which these songs exist. 
III. UNDERSTANDING INDIGENOUS ERASURE 
While there are times when Hopi ceremonial songs and other 
cultural data should be remembered or even recorded, there are 
also times when they are supposed to be forgotten and, perhaps, 
even destroyed. Sometimes this is the result of selective filtering—
sometimes they simply fail to resonate with the current generation, 
or with the local environment, or they are too complex to maintain 
and are soon forgotten. Cultural data can also be forgotten as an act 
of transferring ownership and demonstrating humility. For 
example, several older composers told me that when they give their 
songs to fellow village members for ceremonial performances, they 
forget the song in the process. And, as discussed above, some 
cultural expressions are toxic to those who hear or perform them 
without proper authorization. These are best forgotten if they are 
overheard. Whatever the case, forgetting, deletion, and erasure in 
Indigenous societies is not simply the inevitable outcome of relying 
on collective memory rather than written texts or recording 
technologies to preserve culture. Rather, forgetting can be just as 
intentional and valuable as remembering. Two moments from 
Hopi history provide instructive examples. 
The intentional forgetting of Spanish Catholic ritual from Hopi 
lives following the 140-year Spanish colonization of what is now 
the Southwestern United States played a pivotal role in 
reestablishing Hopi sovereignty and beginning the process of 
healing within the Hopi community. Spanish conquistadores 
arrived on Hopi lands in 1540, but it was not until 1629 that 
Franciscan missionaries (nicknamed tota’tsi, or “dictators”—
someone who wants to “have his own way all the time”) settled on 
Hopi lands.49 By the mid-1660s, the Franciscans had built Spanish 
churches over the top of Hopi gathering and ceremonial spaces 
known as kivas.50 Spanish documents show that after the 
Franciscans baptized roughly forty percent of the Hopi population, 
 
 49. MOQUIS AND KASTIILAM: HOPIS, SPANIARDS AND THE TRAUMA OF HISTORY, supra 
note 15, at 122, 191. 
 50. Id. at 119. 
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they began to brutally extract labor from the entire population, 
disrupting Hopi lifeways and ceremonial practices.51 Hopi people 
were forced to carry heavy logs, water, and other resources 90 to 
100 miles to build churches and provide materials for Catholic 
ceremonies; they were forced to use their own materials and labor 
to comply with Spanish encomiendas (a grant of power from the 
Crown to exact tribute); and they were forced to hide their own 
ceremonial performances because such were considered “idolatry” 
by the Franciscans.52 One Hopi man, Sitkyoma, was tortured and 
murdered by the Franciscans after sponsoring a Hopi nimantiikive 
(ceremony marking the annual departure of the katsinam  or spirit-
beings from Hopi lands), which enabled his daughter-in-law to 
complete the final stage of her Hopi wedding ceremony.53   
On August 10, 1680, the Indigenous peoples of the region 
collectively rose up against the Spanish and retook their territories. 
A network of runners with knowledge of the plan carried knotted 
ropes tracking the days until the coordinated rebellion would take 
place. In nearly all of the Indigenous villages, Spanish priests either 
were executed or fled after being tipped off to the uprising. Spanish 
churches and palaces were looted and burned. In the Hopi villages 
of Orayvi and Awa’ovi, Catholic churches were destroyed, and 
three Franciscan priests were executed.54 Spanish Catholicism and 
its brutal and abusive practices had been forcibly erased from 
Hopi lands. 
For a period of twenty years, Hopi people lived free of Spanish 
domination. Then, in the midst of a Hopi cultural revitalization, 
some Pueblo communities, including some clans in the Hopi village 
of Awa’ovi, began practicing Catholicism again.55 As Hopi elder 
and Tribal Vice-Chairman Elgean Joshevama explained in a 2002 
 
 51. Id. at 60, 139 (Spanish accounts suggest 4,000 individuals were baptized, which 
Hopi oral historians suggest was approximately 40 to 50 percent of the population.). 
 52. Id. at 120–21, 169–77. 
 53. Id. at 170. Katsinam are spirit beings who visit the Hopi people during certain 
periods of the year. Sitkyoma sponsored the nimantiikive out of its ceremonial season while 
the Franciscans were away so that his daughter-in-law could present herself to the katsinam 
and thus complete the required steps for the wedding. I thank Stewart B. Koyiyumptewa of 
the Hopi Cultural Preservation for these insights. 
 54. Thomas E. Sheridan & Stewart Koyiymptewa, Moquis, Kastiilam, and the Trauma of 
History: Hopi Oral Traditions of Seventeenth-Century Franciscan Missionary Abuses, in NEW 
MEXICO AND THE PIMERÍA ALTA: THE COLONIAL PERIOD IN THE AMERICAN SOUTHWEST 250 
(John G. Douglass & William M. Graves eds., 2017). 
 55. Id. at 251–52. 
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interview, Catholic priests—invited and assisted by Awa’ovi 
villagers—”started to reconstruct the remains of their church and 
tried to reconstruct their power there as well.”56 Hopi people across 
Hopi lands recognized the resurgence of a power in the practice of 
Catholicism at Awa’ovi: the inculcation of foreign ritual knowledge 
coupled with a manipulating force that, borrowing the words of 
historian Michel Foucault, had “a hold over others’ bodies, not only 
so that they may do what one wishes, but so that they may operate 
as one wishes.”57 
Sometime between 1700 and 1701, leaders from many of the 
Hopi villages organized and carried out a complete destruction of 
the Hopi village of Awa’ovi, killing most of the men in the village 
and removing the women and children to other villages. As 
Joshevama explains, 
[T]hat destruction, when you think about it, a Hopi village to be 
destroyed by Hopi people, that Hopi lives would be taken, when 
you think about it, how many of our people would be willing to 
make that kind of a decision today? . . . I think that demonstrates 
to us today . . . how strongly the Hopi people felt about saving 
this Hopi way of life. . . . That they just didn’t want any other way 
of life, especially the kind that had been imposed on us by, by 
the Spaniards.58 
The forced erasure of the dogma, rituals, and abusive practices 
of sixteenth century Spanish Catholicism from Hopi memory was 
permanent, intentional, and carried out by Indigenous authority. 
While lives have been risked and even taken to retain Hopi 
rituals and to intentionally forget Catholic ones, some Hopi rituals 
 
 56. MOQUIS AND KASTIILAM: HOPIS, SPANIARDS AND THE TRAUMA OF HISTORY, supra 
note 15, at 241. 
 57. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 138  
(Alan Sheridan trans., Pantheon Books 1st American ed. 1977). Foucault’s description of the 
rise of disciplinary mechanisms of social control in the 17th and 18th centuries aptly captures 
the concern felt by Hopi people in 1700: 
What was then being formed [through training of European soldiers, school 
children, prisoners, and workers] was a policy of coercions that act upon the body, 
a calculated manipulation of its elements, its gestures, its behaviour. The human 
body was entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and 
rearranges it. A ‘political anatomy’, which was also a ‘mechanics of power’, was 
being born; . . . . 
Id. 
 58. MOQUIS AND KASTIILAM: HOPIS, SPANIARDS AND THE TRAUMA OF HISTORY, supra 
note 15, at 241–42. 
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have also been intentionally silenced and forgotten. In his book 
Rethinking Hopi Ethnography, ethnographer Peter Whiteley recounts 
one such episode that happened in the Hopi village of Orayvi 
(Oraibi) in the 1920s.59 K.T. Johnson, a Hopi priest turned 
Mennonite convert, was one of the last members of Oravyi’s Bow 
Clan. As one of the most powerful clans, the Bow Clan held 
ownership over some of the most important ceremonies in the 
village, and Johnson’s position within the clan made him heir to the 
village leadership. But with dwindling numbers, and Johnson’s 
conversion, the Clan had not performed its ceremonies for a 
number of years. At one point, two of Johnson’s rivals from the 
neighboring village of Hotvela (Hotevilla), seemingly intent on 
revitalizing the ceremonies without him, stole the Bow Clan altar 
and other ceremonial objects, thereby demonstrating their 
legitimacy as village leaders.60 
In 1927, however, Johnson’s aunt—the last matriarch of his 
clan—died, which meant the clan would in the next generation 
cease to exist at Orayvi. As quoted by the Mennonite missionary 
who converted him, Johnson declared that “the fire of our clanship 
[was] extinguished.”61 Not long thereafter, Johnson, with the 
Mennonite missionary in tow, approached the rival leaders who 
were in the process of conducting a ceremony, requested the return 
of the sacred objects, and indicated his intention to burn them.62 
Suspicious of the missionary’s influence over Johnson, the rivals 
initially resisted, but later relented, recognizing Johnson’s 
legitimacy as the one rightfully authorized to control the ritual 
objects and the ceremonies pertaining to them. Once in possession 
of the objects, Johnson took them out of Orayvi to his new village 
(Kykotsmovi), piled them up, poured gas on the pile, and asked a 
local young man to light a match.63 What archeologists and 
museum curators today would likely consider priceless historical 
artifacts of great value to humanity were transformed into ash 
and smoke. 
 
 59. PETER M. WHITELEY, RETHINKING HOPI ETHNOGRAPHY 133 (1998). 
 60. Id. at 134–37, 141. 
 61. Id. at 134. 
 62. Id. at 139–40. 
 63. Id. at 152. While it isn’t clear why Johnson didn’t burn the objects himself, historical 
accounts relate that the young man who lit the altar on fire died several months thereafter. I 
thank Stewart B. Koyiymptewa of the Hopi Cultural Preservation Office for these insights. 
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Though a convert to the Mennonite faith, Johnson’s burning of 
these artifacts was, in Whiteley’s view, a means for fulfilling Hopi 
prophecies about the progression of Hopi culture.64 This 
progression necessarily included the death of certain rituals so that 
others could develop, and so new leadership paradigms could 
emerge. The rival leaders themselves recognized this when Johnson 
requested the altar. As recorded in the Mennonite missionary’s 
account of Johnson’s words during the burning, “Alas! It has come, 
but so must it be. By destroying these things, you will have 
DESTROYED the very foundation of our ceremonies. The 
conflagration must spread. Take these and do as you have said.”65 
While the Mennonite missionary probably saw this as a victory in 
his efforts to convert Hopi people, the act of Johnson destroying the 
artifacts was in reality an act of intentional forgetting that further 
reinforced Indigenous authority over ritual knowledge. 
Policy makers of today might attempt to understand the two 
foregoing historical moments as precedents useful in divining a 
standard of care for Hopi or other Indigenous peoples’ cultural 
materials. They might extrapolate rules to determine when 
destructive forgetting should be permitted for Indigenous peoples’ 
survival, and when preserving and remembering are so important 
that no cost—including the sacrifice of human lives—is too great. 
Indeed, I could attempt to weave a concise theoretical thread 
through these powerful examples of forgetting and attempt to 
connect them to our aforementioned village leader’s decision to let 
more of our ceremonies die out. But that is not my place—nor is it 
my purpose in writing this essay. 
What is relevant here for those who establish policy for the care 
of Indigenous voices, knowledges, and other forms of Indigenous 
culture is that the lives of these materials and the networks of which 
they are a part are often purposefully and profoundly finite, at least 
from our limited point of view, and that Indigenous refusals to 
extend these voices, knowledges, and cultural forms in time or 
space or theory are in themselves generative acts reserved for 
Indigenous authorities.66 The refusal to permit the Franciscans’ 
knowledge and power to exist in Hopi society meant that Hopi 
 
 64. Id. at 141–42. 
 65. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 66. For a discussion of the concept of Indigenous refusal, see AUDRA SIMPSON, 
MOHAWK INTERRUPTUS: POLITICAL LIFE ACROSS THE BORDERS OF SETTLER STATES 133 (2014). 
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people were never again subjugated by the Spanish—and, I hope, 
through our memory of that forgetting, Hopi will never again be 
subjugated by any foreign power. And, while it is true that 
Johnson’s act of forgetting meant that some ceremonies are no 
longer performed at Hotevilla, I have witnessed how remnants of 
these ceremonies—words, melodic phrases, affects—have now 
become references in newer cultural expressions, which, through 
collective remembering, acquire profound meanings as they lose 
their particular temporalities and yet retain their effects. Indeed, 
though our present generation may lose direct access to the entirety 
of forgotten ceremonies and their associated songs, the voices that 
sing them continue on in other times and places. In this way, 
forgotten knowledge remains whole, resisting distortion or 
alteration outside of the necessary authorities. 
IV. TOWARD AN INDIGENOUS RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 
When Indigenous voices, likenesses, and other forms of 
Indigenous cultural data are made to live under the preservation 
apparatus of the settler state, Indigenous sovereignty is 
diminished. Thus, the care of Indigenous voices should be, in the 
first instance, in the hands of Indigenous peoples and not those of 
settler governments or private research institutions, archives, and 
museums and their modes of anonymous care. Indigenous care of 
recorded voices and other documentary media presumes the right 
of Indigenous communities to determine how these voices should 
live or whether these voices should be erased, be allowed to 
disintegrate, or simply be forgotten. For Indigenous peoples to 
retain and fully exercise their sovereignty, they must have the 
power to create culture, but also, when necessary, allow that 
culture to die. 
In many ways, this proposed right of Indigenous peoples to 
care for cultural materials parallels current debates regarding the 
right of individuals to have their data erased or “forgotten” by big 
data corporations like Google, Facebook, Apple, and Amazon. 
Governments in several parts of the world have now established 
policies to ensure forgetfulness and erasure of corporate memory 
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in defense of personal autonomy.67 For example, in May 2016, the 
European Union (EU) adopted major revisions to its 1995 Data 
Protection Directive, including the addition of an individual “right 
to be forgotten.”68 The European Parliament found that each 
European citizen “should have the right to have his or her personal 
data erased” under certain conditions, 69 including: 
• Where “the personal data are no longer necessary in relation to 
the purposes for which they [are] collected or otherwise 
processed,”70 or 
• “[W]here [the citizen] has withdrawn his or her consent or 
objects to the processing of personal data concerning him or 
her,”71 or 
• Where “personal data have been unlawfully processed.”72 
The EU was particularly concerned about situations in which 
individuals such as minors were “not fully aware of the risks 
involved” in allowing information about themselves to be digitized 
in the first place.73 At the same time, the EU faced considerable 
pressure from social media corporations, journalists, and 
historians, among others, to weigh carefully the potential impact of 
the right to be forgotten on freedom of expression and information. 
In fact, the EU took particular care to preserve an exception to the 
right to be forgotten for “archiving purposes in the public interest, 
scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes,” 
among other seemingly self-evident publicly beneficial interests.74 
In the United States, legal scholars initially mocked European 
efforts to implement a right to be forgotten, particularly a 2014 
Court of Justice of the European Union ruling which required 
 
 67. See Joseph Jerome, California Privacy Law Shows Data Protection Is on the March, 
ANTITRUST MAG., Fall 2018, at 96 (reporting that the European Union’s General Data 
Protection Regulation had “spurred other countries, including India and Brazil, to consider 
and adopt similar laws”); Hans Graux, Jef Ausloos & Peggy Valcke, The Right to Be Forgotten 
in the Internet Era (Interdisc. Ctr. for L. & ICT, ICRI Working Paper 11/2012, 2012). 
 68. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 17, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 43. 
 69. Id. at Preamble ¶ 65. 
 70. Id. at art. 17(1)(a). 
 71. Id. at Preamble ¶ 65; id. at art. 17(1)(b), (c). 
 72. Id. at art. 17(1)(d). 
 73. Id. at Preamble ¶ 65. 
 74. Id. at art. 17(3)(a), (d). Just who the “public” is that benefits from these activities 
may necessitate further examination. 
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Google Spain to delete search results containing what the court 
deemed “irrelevant and excessive” information about a Spanish 
citizen’s debt auction, though the information had already been 
made public.75 Of particular concern to commentators was the 
seeming incongruence of the right to be forgotten with U.S. First 
Amendment law, with one scholar describing it as “the biggest 
threat to free speech on the Internet in the coming decade.”76 And 
yet, not long after the Google Spain decision and the E.U.’s 
implementation of the right to be forgotten, states like California 
moved forward with their own statutes akin to the E.U.’s right, 
albeit with substantial First Amendment carve-outs. The California 
Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), for example, requires that a 
business which receives a verifiable request from consumers to 
erase personal data “shall delete the consumer’s personal 
information from its records.”77 But the drafters of the CCPA made 
explicit that its variant on the right to be forgotten does not require 
businesses to erase information necessary to “[e]xercise free speech 
[or] ensure the right of another consumer to exercise that 
consumer’s right of free speech.”78 Even so, the law has raised 
concerns over the prospect that some data, like a viral tweet or 
Facebook post, might be removed upon the request of the 
originator after being widely commented on by the public, thereby 
inhibiting public discourse.79 
Interestingly, nothing in the EU’s right to be forgotten or the 
CCPA currently requires that the respective country or state or its 
 
 75. Some commentators considered the European court to be out of their minds. Kieron 
O’Hara, The Right to Be Forgotten: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, DIGITAL CITIZEN,  
July–Aug. 2015, at 2–3, http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=7131393. 
 76. Rosen, supra note 11, at 88; see also Savanna Shuntich, The Life, the Death, and the 
Long-Awaited Resurrection of Privacy: How Americans Can Reclaim Their Lives from the Internet 
with a Right to Be Forgotten, 41 HUM. RTS. 2, 2–3 (2016) (explaining one view, common in the 
United States, that “a right to be forgotten would be impossible in the United States under 
the First Amendment and existing First Amendment jurisprudence even though it could be 
beneficial to the citizens”). 
 77. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105(c). 
 78. Id. § 1798.105(d)(4). Importantly, the CCPA also allows entities to keep 
information collected from consumers to “[e]ngage in public or peer-reviewed scientific, 
historical, or statistical research in the public interest” as long as the data holder complies 
with ethics and privacy laws and the consumer “has provided informed consent.” Id. 
§ 1798.105(d)(6). Such a provision alone would be unlikely to impede Tribal demands for 
erasure under the CCPA, as few researchers prior to the 1960s obtained informed consent 
from Tribal members before recording or collecting data from them. 
 79. See Jerome, supra note 67, at 99. 
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cultural institutions take into account the right of Indigenous 
individuals and communities—enshrined in the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP)—to 
receive redress for unauthorized taking of Indigenous knowledge 
or expression, or to secure Indigenous peoples’ rights to maintain, 
control, protect, and develop their cultures and intellectual 
property under their own laws and protocols.80 Such an extension 
of the right to be forgotten, I argue, is necessary to allow Indigenous 
peoples to properly care for their voices, images, and other forms 
of recorded cultural data. 
While some may see the right to be forgotten as an excessive 
burden on speech and public discourse, I argue that recognizing 
and upholding Indigenous peoples’ sovereign rights to care for 
their voices, images, and cultural data are consistent with broader 
theories of human dignity while also specific to their unique 
relationships with colonizing governments like the United States. 
The First Amendment’s prohibition on government regulation of 
speech has been understood as necessary to support “uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open” debate on public issues.81 Thus, 
government limitations on citizens’ access to information are 
typically disfavored by American courts because these limitations 
potentially stifle or increase the costs of a robust public sphere and 
effective self-governance.82 And yet courts and commentators have 
 
 80. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, while not 
necessarily binding on signatories, does provide global norms for data gathered from 
Indigenous groups. See G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. DOCS. A/RES/61/295, United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, art. 11(2) (Sept. 13, 2007) (“States shall 
provide redress . . . developed in conjunction with [I]ndigenous peoples, with respect to their 
cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken without their free, prior and 
informed consent or in violation of their laws, traditions and customs.”); see also id. at art. 
31(1) (“Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their 
cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions . . . . They also 
have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their intellectual property over such 
cultural heritage, traditional knowledge, and traditional cultural expressions.”). 
 81. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
 82. See, e.g., Post, supra note 11, at 993–94 (criticizing the European Union’s Right to be 
Forgotten, codified in the General Data Protection Regulation, as incompatible with the kinds 
of “communicative action required by the democratic public sphere,” which most European 
nations already regulate to “protect the dignity of human beings”); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, 
FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 24–25 (1948) (“The welfare of the 
community requires that those who decide issues shall understand them. They must know 
what they are voting about. And this in turn, requires that so far as time allows, all facts and 
interests relevant to the problem shall be fully and fairly presented . . . . What is essential is 
not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said.”). 
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long recognized that circulation of private information in a  
way that causes harm may need to be curtailed to protect 
individual dignity.83 
The right of publicity tort provides one example of a way 
dignitary interests have been defended in American courts without 
offending free speech principles. As recently articulated by 
Professors Post and Rothman, the publicity tort’s “right of dignity” 
prevents the misappropriation of an individual’s voice, image, or 
other forms of identity in ways “that are inconsistent with forms of 
respect essential to the integrity of personality.”84 This dignity right 
recognizes that people’s identities are intersubjective, and that we 
depend on others to maintain the integrity of our identities by 
abiding by certain social norms of respect or “civility rules.”85  
Unconsented appropriations of one’s identity that violate these 
civility rules in ways that are “highly offensive to a reasonable 
person,” causing shame, embarrassment, or emotional distress, 
may result in liability,86 notwithstanding First Amendment 
objections.87 Speech acts that violate one’s right to dignity by 
disclosing matters of purely private significance (as opposed to 
matters that are newsworthy or otherwise of public concern) are 
among those that may be so “highly offensive” that they fall outside 
of the First Amendment’s ambit.88   
While state and federal courts have upheld rights to dignity for 
individual American plaintiffs, they have not yet determined what 
violations of Indigenous peoples’ dignitary rights can be remedied 
 
 83. See generally Post, supra note 9 (arguing that the common law invasion of privacy 
tort protects civility norms and safeguards human dignity); Warren & Brandeis, supra note 9 
(discussing whether the law at the time could be properly invoked to protect the desirable 
principle of individual privacy). 
 84. Robert C. Post & Jennifer E. Rothman, The First Amendment and the Right(s) of 
Publicity, 130 YALE L.J. 86, 165 (2020). 
 85. Id. at 122 (describing “civility rules” as those which “convey the respect we deem 
necessary for the maintenance of our personality”). 
 86. Id. at 122–24 (citing cases in which unconsented appropriation of one’s voice or 
image resulted in shame, emotional distress, or embarrassment) (internal quotations 
omitted). Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977) (restating the common-
law invasion of privacy tort as requiring the publication of a matter of another’s private life 
“that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern 
to the public”). 
 87. See Post & Rothman, supra note 84, at 165, 167–68. 
 88. Id.  Note that “public concern” does not include speech that reveals private affairs 
for “mere curiosity” or for the “voyeuristic thrill of penetrating the wall of privacy that 
surrounds a stranger.” Id. at 167–68; id. at 168 n.357; id. at 170 n.364.  
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without impermissibly constraining speech.  Given the colonized 
status of Indigenous peoples in the United States, it seems unlikely 
that the appropriate balance between Indigenous peoples’ rights to 
dignity and American free speech will turn simply on whether the 
speech in question is “highly offensive to a reasonable [presumably 
settler] person” as an ordinary right to publicity claim might 
require. Indeed, Indigenous societies and their sovereign 
governments maintain rules and protocols governing the 
appropriate circulation of voices, images, and cultural data that are 
often distinct from those embraced by the United States 
constitution and the general American public.89  Rather, the balance 
between Indigenous dignity and American free speech must 
account for duties the United States owes to Indigenous peoples as 
a result of American colonization, which sharply curtailed the 
ability of Tribes to maintain and defend their own “civility rules.”   
Just what duties the United States has to uphold Indigenous 
dignity can be observed through the history of federal policy 
toward Indigenous peoples.  Since its founding, the United States 
has, through statutes, treaties, law, and administrative policy, 
repeatedly recognized and upheld the collective identities, 
autonomy, and self-determination of Native American Tribes.90 
Coupled with that recognition, the U.S. Supreme Court long ago 
established the federal government’s duty to protect the political 
identities and associated rights of Indigenous peoples who, owing 
to American conquest, became dependent on the United States.91  
 
 89. This distinction between Constitutional principles governing American and Tribal 
public spheres has been articulated by the federal courts. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 
436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) (finding that Tribal governments are “separate sovereigns pre-existing 
the Constitution” and therefore unconstrained by most Bill of Rights limitations); Native Am. 
Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131, 134–35 (10th Cir. 1959) (“No provision of the 
Constitution makes the First Amendment applicable to Indian nations.”); see also Trevor 
Reed, Creative Sovereignty: Should Copyright Apply on Tribal Lands? (forthcoming 2021) 
(discussing differences in the ways Indigenous peoples and American settlers govern their 
public spheres). 
 90. See generally Exec. Order No. 13175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67249, § 2 (Nov. 9, 2000) 
(recognizing the ongoing policy of the United States, established in the U.S. Constitution, its 
treaties, statutes, executive orders, and judicial decisions, to recognize Indigenous peoples 
as “domestic dependent nations,” to work with Tribes on a “government-to-government 
basis,” and to support “the right of Indian tribes to self-government . . . tribal sovereignty 
and self-determination”). 
 91. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383–84 (1886) (“These Indian tribes . . . 
are communities dependent on the United States. Dependent largely for their daily food. 
 
5.REED_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE) 3/28/2021  1:05 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 46:4 (2021) 
1144 
 
Though for much of the nineteenth and first part of the twentieth 
century the federal government and American settlers regularly 
participated in pillaging human remains, sacred objects, and other 
forms of Indigenous identity and culture in utter derogation of 
Indigenous peoples’ laws and social norms, Congress began in the 
latter half of the twentieth century to fulfill its duty to uphold and 
protect collective Indigenous identities and rights to culture.92 In 
efforts to provide partial redress for previous violations of 
Indigenous human rights, Congress passed the landmark Native 
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990 
(NAGPRA).93  The law requires federal agencies, federally funded 
museums, and other institutions to return sacred or patrimonial 
cultural materials from their collections to Native American Tribes 
(or a lineal descendant) when those items had been acquired 
without proper Tribal authorization.94 This government-sanctioned 
removal and return of ceremonial implements and sacred artifacts 
from museums’ shelves and displays has undoubtedly curtailed 
American speech and public knowledge about Indigenous peoples. 
And yet, over the last three decades, thousands of these 
repatriations have been carried out under NAGPRA to remedy 
violations of Indigenous dignity,95 apparently without raising First 
Amendment objections. The policy of the United States to recognize 
and protect collective Indigenous identities and culture may very 
 
Dependent for their political rights. . . . From their very weakness and helplessness, so 
largely due to the course of dealing of the federal government with them and the treaties in 
which it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection . . . .”). 
 92. See generally PHILIP DELORIA, PLAYING INDIAN (1999) (documenting the history of 
appropriation of Indigenous identities in the United States); Jack F. Trope & Walter Echo 
Hawk, Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act: Background and Legislative 
History, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35 (describing the ways human remains and cultural objects were 
taken from Indigenous lands in violation of norms of respect and dignity, and providing a 
legislative history of the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act). 
 93. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–13; see S. REP. NO. 101-473, at 2, 4 (1990) (“[T]he process for 
determining the appropriate disposition and treatment of Native American . . . sacred 
objects, and objects of cultural patrimony should be governed by respect for Native 
human rights.”). 
 94. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001, 3005(a)(5) (requiring the expeditious return of sacred objects 
and objects of cultural patrimony upon request of a Tribe or lineal descendant when the 
holding institution lacks a proper right of possession). 
 95. NAT’L NATIVE AM. GRAVES PROT. & REPATRIATION ACT (NAGPRA) PROGRAM, 
FISCAL YEAR 2018 REPORT, at 3 (2018), https://irma.nps.gov/DataStore/DownloadFile/ 
620933 (estimating that approximately 15,000 cultural items (presumably sacred objects and 
objects of cultural patrimony) have been repatriated under NAGPRA). 
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well justify other federal remedies aimed at redressing dignitary 
harms to Indigenous peoples without disturbing the speech 
guarantees of the First Amendment. 
Of course, not all unconsented uses of Indigenous voices, 
images, or cultural data will rise to the level of dignitary harm.  But 
when Indigenous identities and cultural data are used in American 
public discourse in violation of rules of civility maintained by 
Tribal sovereigns, Tribes and their members often experience these 
as “abusive and alienating.”96 As Rebecca Tsosie reports, many 
Indigenous groups have for centuries had their voices, images, and 
other cultural information collected and documented, often against 
their will, and then “used ‘against’ [them] . . . link[ing] them with 
criminality, susceptibility to disease, or vulnerability.”97 These 
repeated affronts to Indigenous dignity were in many instances 
occasioned by invasions of privacy by settler governments and 
institutions intent on collecting cultural data; but they are 
perpetuated today through the continued, unconsented use and 
misrepresentation of that data. Illicit uses of Indigenous voices, 
images, and other forms of cultural data often led (and in some 
cases still lead) to deprivations of Indigenous groups’ collective 
autonomy and rights of self-government.98 
Upholding Indigenous dignity today therefore necessitates 
affirming a Tribal government’s right “to regulate data within its 
territory,” but also a right to “protect Indigenous peoples more 
broadly from harmful or exploitative policies of the encompassing 
nation-state,” whether that protection is accomplished through a 
Tribe’s affirmative care or, when necessary, through intentional 
erasure.99 Those who would reify free speech so as to condone the 
continued invasion of Indigenous peoples’ sovereignty over their 
own voices, cultures, and representations for the purpose of 
enriching settler political discourse only inflame the dispossessive 
work of colonialism while sidestepping the immense imbalance in 
 
 96. See Post, supra note 11, at 1008–09. As Professor Post notes, the problem with using 
data in violation of civility rules is that doing so disrupts “essential activities and key 
relationships” that give people their personality and prevents people from experiencing 
public discourse “as a medium through which they might influence the construction of 
public opinion” or contribute to a shared democracy. 
 97. See Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Data Governance and Informational Privacy: Constructing 
“Indigenous Data Sovereignty”, 80 MONT. L. REV. 229, 245 (2019). 
 98. See Ishii, supra note 7. 
 99. Id. at 244. 
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access to knowledge that significantly favors settlers over 
Indigenous communities.100 
One of Indigenous sovereignty’s core attributes must be the 
ability to care for the voices, likenesses, and cultural 
representations of our people: past, present, and future. This may 
include (but is certainly not limited to) the ability of Indigenous 
communities to determine appropriate preservation techniques 
and possibilities of circulation for these materials. It may also 
require archives to deaccession them and to transfer complete 
ownership of physical media and intellectual or cultural property 
rights to Indigenous communities. But it most certainly includes 
the rights of Indigenous peoples to exclude the settler state from 
using and accessing Indigenous voices, images, and other media 
documenting their culture, the right to care for those media, and 
the right to demand their destruction. 
CONCLUSION 
Determining when recorded Indigenous voices should  
be forgotten—or, in the case of archival materials, deaccessioned  
or destroyed—can be a deeply disturbing question in an era in 
which there is a prevailing sense that everything can, or even should 
be remembered and preserved. As Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, 
Professor of Internet Governance and Regulation at Oxford 
University, has written, “If we had to worry that any information 
 
 100. In her response to MICHAEL BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE? (2003) 
(disapproving of Indigenous peoples’ use of American intellectual property law to protect 
Indigenous culture from misappropriation, and advocating instead for an education-based 
approach), anthropologist and Indigenous studies scholar Audra Simpson refutes claims by 
free speech advocates that Indigenous culture should be freely available to the public in part 
by noting how limited Indigenous peoples’ access to knowledge products is compared to 
non-Indigenous citizens of the United States and Canada. Audra Simpson, On the Logic of 
Discernment, 59 AM. Q. 479 (2007). As a recent United States Federal Communications 
Commission Study points out, even today Tribal homes—particularly on rural federal 
reservations—lag behind the rest of the nation in terms of broadband internet coverage, 
making it more difficult for them to access media otherwise accessible to non-Indigenous 
members of the public. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, REPORT ON BROADBAND DEPLOYMENT IN 
INDIAN COUNTRY 1 (May 2019) (“[W]hile 92% of housing units on urban Tribal lands are 
covered by a fixed terrestrial provider of 25/3 Mbps broadband service—just six points 
behind their non-Tribal urban counterparts—just 46.6% of housing units on rural Tribal 
lands have access to that service, a nearly 27-point gap compared to non-Tribal rural areas. 
Mobile LTE coverage on Tribal lands is similarly behind deployment on non-Tribal lands; 
while 99.8% of the population living on non-Tribal areas are covered by mobile LTE service, 
only 96% of the population living on Tribal land are covered with such service.”). 
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about us would be remembered for longer than we live, would  
we still express our views on matters of trivial gossip, share 
personal experiences, make various political comments, or would 
we self-censor? The chilling effect of perfect memory alters 
our behavior.”101 
Knowledge about the past is ever accumulating through public 
records and digital means. Some have found this hopelessly 
intoxicating. Misplaced words, misinformation, and endless 
commentary continue to inhabit the life-worlds of people’s virtual 
and actual lives as corporations generate massive archives filled 
with big data’s (toxic) assets. Injected into this global predicament 
through settler collecting and preservation enterprises, Indigenous 
voices may need to decay or be forgotten for the sake of allowing 
Indigenous communities to fully live. As with the example of Hopi 
cornstalks, some archived cultural materials might provide 
beneficial guidance and direction for future creative efforts, but 
may lack the substance, in their preserved form, to generate 
productive effects in today’s complex Indigenous worlds. Close, 
personal collaborations with, and deference to, Indigenous 
communities in the care of their voices, rather than anonymous 
safeguarding of their culture by settler institutions, are critical as 
we begin to recognize Indigenous dignity in the governance of 




 101. VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER, THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE DIGITAL AGE 5, 
15 (2009). 
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